$27.3M ANIF: Where Did the Money Go?

The Promise

Confirmed - Government Records

In 2019, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's government created the Armenian National Interests Fund -- ANIF. The pitch was grand: a sovereign wealth fund modeled on Singapore's Temasek and Abu Dhabi's Mubadala. It would attract billions in foreign investment, modernize Armenia's economy, and signal to the world that the post-revolution government was open for business.

In August 2025, ANIF was dissolved. It had attracted zero significant foreign investment. It had cost Armenian taxpayers 10.7 billion AMD -- approximately $27.3 million. Its executive director was an international fugitive. And the new management could not even explain where most of the money went.

This is the story of those missing millions.

Where the Money Went

Confirmed - Audit Records Pattern Analysis

The Fugitive Director: Davit Papazian

Confirmed - Law Enforcement

Davit Papazian was ANIF's executive director -- the man entrusted with $27.3 million of public money. He studied at Sciences Po Paris and ESSEC Business School. He had an MBA and international connections. He was, on paper, exactly the kind of person you would want running a sovereign fund.

In September 2025, Armenian authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Papazian. The charges: money laundering, forgery, and abuse of office. By then, he was already gone.

Here is what makes Papazian particularly interesting from an intelligence perspective: he has zero presence in any known breach database. In our analysis of hundreds of Armenian officials and businesspeople, this level of digital hygiene is almost unique. Papazian either never used common email services, used them under aliases, or systematically cleaned his digital footprint before disappearing. For a man who managed public funds, that level of operational security is telling.

The Moscow Black Hole: $6.9 Million, Zero Receipts

Confirmed - Audit Records Confirmed - Property Records

Of all the missing money, the Moscow branch is the most brazen. Over four years, ANIF's Moscow office consumed $6.9 million. When new management took over after Papazian was fired, they found -- according to their own statements -- "no information" about how Moscow used the funds. Four years of spending. Zero documentation.

The office itself was 76.5 square meters at Ostozhenka 37, Building 7, Moscow -- a prestigious address near the Kremlin. Records indicate between 4 and 15 employees at various times. Roughly $6 million was categorized as "salaries." Even at Moscow's inflated rates, paying 15 people $6 million over four years works out to $100,000 per employee per year -- for a fund that attracted zero investment.

But the real question is not what the Moscow office spent money on. The real question is what it was actually doing.

The Man Behind Moscow: Sergey Grigoryan

Confirmed - Breach Data Confirmed - Corporate Records

Sergey Grigoryan, born 1964, ran ANIF's Moscow office. His background tells you everything about the sophistication of this operation.

Before ANIF, Grigoryan worked at Pioneer Investments -- now part of Amundi, the world's largest asset manager with $2.2 trillion under management. His corporate email password at Pioneer was profit. He then served as Executive Vice President of the Association of Russian Banks and advised the chairman of Armenia's Ardshinbank. He sat on the board of Unistream Bank, a money transfer company.

This was not some provincial bureaucrat in over his head. This was a professional who understood precisely how international money moves -- and how to make it disappear.

The Pre-Existing Offshore: Marathon S.A.

Confirmed - BVI Records Confirmed - Trident Trust Records

Here is the detail that transforms this from a story about mismanagement into something far more deliberate. Before ANIF was created, Papazian and Grigoryan already had a shared offshore company: Marathon S.A., registered in the British Virgin Islands.

Both men were serviced by Trident Trust -- one of the world's largest offshore corporate service providers, which has appeared in multiple international money laundering investigations. The same offshore provider handled both the future ANIF director and the future Moscow office chief -- before they were ever appointed to manage public money.

When Papazian then appointed Grigoryan to run ANIF's Moscow branch, the partnership was not new. It was pre-existing. The infrastructure for moving money offshore was already built.

The CFW Triangle: 8 Days to $3.8 Million

Confirmed - Corporate Registry Confirmed - Court Records

If the Moscow branch is the biggest theft by volume, the CFW CJSC investment is the most structurally corrupt.

In May 2023, ANIF's subsidiary -- the Entrepreneur and State Fund -- invested $3.8 million in a company called CFW CJSC. The company had been created eight days earlier. Within a year, it had one employee.

The director of CFW was Karine Andreasyan. She owned 33% of a company called Lav Products LLC. The other major shareholder of Lav Products, with 34%? Mariam Pahlavuni -- the wife of Tigran Avinyan.

Tigran Avinyan chaired ANIF's board.

Andreasyan has since been prosecuted for money laundering. Avinyan, who went on to become Mayor of Yerevan, faces criminal charges under Article 277 of the Armenian Criminal Code. He has denied wrongdoing.

The Wife's Company: $1.8 Million for 17 Trucks

Confirmed - Corporate Records Confirmed - Breach Data

Susanna Gevorgyan is Sergey Grigoryan's wife. She owned Global Connect CJSC, which received $1.8 million from ANIF -- reportedly for the purchase of "17 trucks." The Moscow office chief's wife's company received public money from the fund he helped run.

In breach databases, Gevorgyan's email gevorgyan.susanna@bk.ru appears with the password hayastan -- the Armenian word for "Armenia." Despite living in Moscow and operating through Russian email services, the family maintained Armenian identity. The money, however, flowed in one direction: from Armenia's treasury to their accounts.

The Ghost Office: From ANIF to Evabeta

Confirmed - Corporate Records Pattern Analysis

After ANIF was dissolved, something remarkable happened at Ostozhenka 37/7 in Moscow. Grigoryan's post-ANIF companies -- Evabeta JSC and Evatech LLC -- moved into the same office space that ANIF's Moscow branch had occupied.

Evatech is particularly interesting. It is 25% owned by Grigoryan and 25% by his daughter Valeria Grigorian. The company has an email registered on orange.fr -- a French ISP. This French connection maps directly to Papazian's Paris educational background (Sciences Po, ESSEC Business School). The password ev220599 appears on both the French and American accounts for Evatech.

The pattern: public money flowed into ANIF's Moscow office. The office was then inherited by Grigoryan's private companies. The same people, the same address, the same network -- now operating privately with whatever remained.

The ZCMC Shares: A Gift From a Sanctioned Oligarch

Confirmed - Corporate Records

In September 2021, ANIF received 15% of shares in Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine (ZCMC) -- Armenia's most valuable mining asset. These shares were "donated" by GeoProMining, controlled by Roman Trotsenko, a Russian oligarch who has since been placed under US sanctions.

ANIF also received 6.8% of ZCMC from AMP Holding (Karen Hakobian), bringing the government-linked stake to 21.875%. The fund that was supposed to manage Armenia's crown jewel of mining became the center of a corruption scandal. When Papazian fled, the shares were the one thing of value left behind.

The Board: A French Ex-PM and the Exit Door

Confirmed - Public Records

ANIF's board included Dominique de Villepin, former Prime Minister of France. His presence lent international credibility to the fund. When Papazian was fired and the scandal broke, de Villepin resigned.

His departure was symbolic. The international veneer that ANIF had carefully constructed -- the French ex-PM on the board, the Sciences Po-educated director, the Pioneer Investments-trained Moscow chief -- peeled away to reveal what was underneath: a mechanism for transferring public money to private hands.

Digital Forensics: The Breach Data Map

Confirmed - Breach Data

Our OSINT analysis of publicly available breach databases reveals the digital footprint of the ANIF network. These credentials were already exposed in public breach compilations at the time of analysis.

Note: Davit Papazian -- the fugitive director -- has zero presence in any known breach database. In an investigation spanning hundreds of Armenian officials, this level of digital absence is extraordinary. He either never used standard email services, used aliases, or scrubbed his footprint before fleeing. The man entrusted with $27.3 million in public funds was careful about one thing: not leaving digital traces.

The Money Flow

Pattern Analysis

Follow the money from source to disappearance:

Timeline of a Scandal

What ANIF Promised vs. What It Delivered

The Question Nobody Answered

Prime Minister Pashinyan created ANIF. His deputy Avinyan chaired its board. When the scandal broke, Pashinyan called it a "disgrace" -- but he had protected Avinyan throughout. Avinyan went on to become Mayor of Yerevan before the criminal charges caught up.

The fund burned through $27.3 million of public money in six years. Its director is a fugitive. Its Moscow office cannot account for $6.9 million. Its board chairman's wife's business partner received $3.8 million through an eight-day-old shell company backed by Delaware entities at a known corporate shell factory address.

And the fund's crowning achievement -- the ZCMC shares -- came as a "gift" from a Russian oligarch who would later be sanctioned by the United States.

When a sovereign wealth fund attracts zero investment, costs $27.3 million, and its director flees the country -- at what point does it stop being incompetence and start being the plan?

Methodology

This investigation is based on Armenian government audit records, corporate registry filings, court documents, publicly available breach databases, BVI corporate records, property records, DNS and WHOIS data, and open-source intelligence. No systems were accessed, penetrated, or tested. All credentials referenced were already publicly exposed in breach compilations at the time of analysis. OWL does not encourage unauthorized access to any system.